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Unii Europejskiej (TSUE) w sprawach statusu prawnego sędziów 
Sądu Najwyższego w Polsce
ABSTRACT
The analysis presented in this article concerns the impact of Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) jurisprudence on the legal situation of Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative 
Court judges in Poland. The main assumption of the presented considerations is that the CJEU, in 
providing answers to preliminary questions submitted to it by Polish courts adjudicating cases related 
to judicial appointments and retirements, strengthens the independence of the courts and the independ-
ence of the judiciary, assuming that these are systemic elements of a functioning judiciary subject to 
EU law. For this reason, the CJEU considers itself competent to shape these systemic values under 
Polish law. At the same time, this body does not notice the problem of jurisdiction of Polish courts 
posing legal questions, which becomes an important theoretical and practical issue, because it may 
affect the legality and effectiveness of judgements passed on the basis of answers given by the CJEU. 
Detailed considerations focus on two types of judgements of the CJEU, which were made in connection 
with the retirement of judges, as a result of questions submitted to the Court by the Supreme Court 
and Supreme Administrative Court. The subject of the questions related to the compatibility with 
EU law of the scope of legal protection granted in Polish law to a judge against resolutions adopted 
in such cases by the National Council of the Judiciary. The considerations presented conclude that 
in the case of a CJEU judgement issued as a result of a question posed by the Supreme Court, the 
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jurisdiction of the authority posing the question was infringed, and this should have consequences 
for the scope of binding the court adjudicating on the answer provided by the CJEU.
Keywords: preliminary questions; Court of Justice of the European Union; National Council of 
the Judiciary; National Council of the Judiciary; retirement of judges; Polish law
INTRODUCTION
The aim of the considerations undertaken in this article is to present a legal 
problem that has arisen in connection with changes made in Poland in the broadly 
understood judiciary reforms. In this context, divergences appeared concerning the 
possibility of the retirement of judges, especially the compatibility of legal solutions 
proposed by the Polish legislator with EU law. As a result, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) took action, and after the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court submitted relevant questions, the CJEU evaluated the normative 
solutions adopted in Poland concerning the rules of retiring judges1 of the Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, and also expressed its opinion on the 
control of acts – resolutions of the National Council of the Judiciary adopted in the 
procedure for appointing judges2 and upon the retirement of judges. In both cases, 
despite the different subject matter to which the questions referred for a preliminary 
ruling relate, a common legal problem arises. It relates to the competence of the CJEU 
to make a statement in this area, and thus the ability of the competent national courts 
to answer the questions posed, when considering legal remedies against resolutions 
adopted by the bodies mentioned above ruling on specific cases.
This common denominator, which appears in the case of questions referred to 
the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, allows for a general treatment of the issue under 
consideration, despite the substantive differences of the CJEU rulings themselves. 
In each of them, the question of whether the CJEU was the competent court to an-
swer the questions posed by the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court 
comes to the foreground. In the doubt that arises in this respect, it is not a question 
of whether under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union3 the Tribunal is competent to hear a question for a preliminary ruling, since 
the fact that it may act within this scope is undisputed. It may be controversial in 
this respect that the CJEU assumed its jurisdiction to answer questions, without 
explicit reference to the jurisdiction of the national courts submitting the question 
and the subject matter of the case that gave rise to the answer. Deficiencies in this 
1 For example, see judgement of the CJEU of 19 November 2019, C-585/19, C-624/18 and 
C-625/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982.
2 Judgement of the CJEU of 2 March 2021, C-842/18.
3 Journal of Laws 2004, no. 90, item 864/2, hereinafter: TFEU.
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respect may be a cause for concern, because they give rise to the conclusion that 
in the case of questions for a preliminary ruling, the CJEU does not examine its 
subject-matter jurisdiction and the formal correctness of the request. This concern is 
all the more justified in light of the fact that none of the rulings subject to analysis, 
issued under the preliminary ruling procedure, i.e. relating to the retirement status of 
Supreme Court judges and review of National Council of the Judiciary resolutions 
on the nomination of candidates for the position of judge in the Supreme Court, 
mentioned this issue. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the CJEU responds to 
a question for a preliminary ruling without examining whether it comes from the 
competent court from the point of view of national law, on the assumption that the 
court asking the question always acts within its competence, and the CJEU has 
no power to interpret national law. It therefore examines its jurisdiction and the 
admissibility of the question from the point of view of the EU law.4
The verification of such an assumption shall be made within the framework of 
a dogmatic analysis, i.e. the presentation of normative grounds related to the status 
of judges of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court and the legal 
consequences resulting from the answers given by the CJEU to the Polish courts 
within the framework of preliminary issues within the meaning of Article 267 
TFEU. Within the scope of national regulations, the basic tool implementing the 
dogmatic approach to the presented problems is the linguistic and logical method 
as well as the analytical method, while in the conducted considerations both of 
them intermingle due to the impossibility of their clear separation on the grounds 
of the interpretation of normative material.5 On the other hand, in the references 
to the EU law, and especially CJEU jurisprudence, argumentative elements occur.
THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT OF PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS SHAPING 
THE SYSTEMIC POSITION OF SUPREME COURT JUDGES
1. General comments
In the background of the dispute related to the reform of the Polish judiciary 
in 2017–2019, legal problems, including those of a systemic nature, hitherto unno-
ticed or even non-existent, have emerged. First of all, it was necessary to raise the 
question of the relationship between the courts in Poland and the EU law, assuming, 
naturally, that the Polish courts are, at the same time, the European Union courts, 
4 See A. Sikora, Praktyka Trybunału Sprawiedliwości w postępowaniach na podstawie art. 267 
TFUE w świetle orzecznictwa i ostatniej reformy procedury, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2014, 
no. 11, pp. 35–41.
5 See J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, Metody prawnicze, Kraków 2004, pp. 37–39.





and thus to answer the question to what extent EU law shapes the systemic model of 
national judiciary, including influencing the status of judges in general, and judges 
of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court in particular, as judges 
of courts of last instance within the meaning of EU regulations. Attempts made at 
that time, by various entities, to change the current legal status regulating the legal 
status of judges and actions aimed at stopping such changes became the subject 
of statements of many EU bodies, but above all they resulted in CJEU rulings. It 
was basically the result of preliminary questions submitted to the CJEU by the 
formations of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court adjudicating 
on cases involving appointment to judicial office or retirement of a judge. In each 
of those cases, without going into the merits of the case, the rulings issued by the 
CJEU were the basis for the rulings passed by the Polish courts. The analysis of 
their content and the arguments presented in support of their accuracy lead to the 
conclusion that certain aspects related to the issue of questions for a preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU have not been noticed, although they seem fundamental for the 
correct application of the law.
First of all, a doubt arises as to whether in the case of the CJEU ruling on 
retirement of judges of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court, 
particularly under Article 111 § 1 of the Act of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme 
Court,6 the question for a preliminary ruling was referred by the competent na-
tional court, and whether in such a situation the CJEU could answer the question. 
It depends on the resolution of this issue to assess the further consequences that 
followed the CJEU judgement of 19 November 2019,7 in particular the judgement 
of the Supreme Court of 5 December 20198 implementing the guidelines addressed 
by the CJEU to the court making the preliminary question, and consequently for the 
resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 January 2020.9 The ambiguities appearing 
in this respect require an in-depth analysis as they affect the stability of the Polish 
legal order. Therefore, further considerations will focus primarily on this issue, 
although each of the presented judgements has many very interesting threads in 
the field of substantive and procedural law. Some of the theses contained in them 
may be considered accurate, while others are completely misguided. However, due 
to the limited size of the article and its different scope, they cannot be the subject 
of in-depth consideration. If they appear, it is only on the margins of the main ar-
gument, more to illustrate the essence of the raised issue, and not as independent 
problems. Besides, it should be assumed that every problem of jurisprudence con-
6 Journal of Laws 2018, item 5, hereinafter: the Supreme Court Act.
7 Judgement of the CJEU of 19 November 2019, C-585/19, C-624/18 and C-625/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:982.
8 III PO 7/18, BOSN.
9 BSA I 4110-1/20, LEX no. 2770251.
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sists of basic and supplementary questions. The fundamental ones determine the 
meaningfulness of the latter. In the present case, the jurisdiction of the courts, i.e. 
that of the court asking the question for a preliminary ruling and that of the court 
subsequently deciding the case, must be regarded as fundamental, which further 
justifies limiting the scope of the considerations.
The considerations undertaken here focus on the legal status of a Supreme 
Court judge, which in practice means that they also apply to judges of the Supreme 
Administrative Court, since this group of judges does not have separate regulations 
concerning retirement status. In this respect, the regulations applicable to Supreme 
Court judges apply directly to Supreme Administrative Court judges. Indirectly, 
however, the presented comments may be used as a basis for evaluating the ac-
quisition of retirement status by common and administrative court judges, but not 
so much in terms of the conditions for retirement status as such, as they may have 
their specificity depending on the status of the judge, although under the current law 
there are no such differences. As far as common and administrative court judges 
are concerned, it should always be borne in mind that the provisions concerning 
common court judges apply10 mutatis mutandis to administrative (voivodship) court 
judges. Regardless of the above, the purpose of the views presented here is not to 
analyse the differences arising in the substantive conditions for retirement, but to 
indicate the procedural consequences of CJEU judgements resolving preliminary 
questions arising in connection with retirement.
2. Competence of the body making a reference for a preliminary ruling 
under Article 267 TFEU
An analysis of the provisions governing proceedings before the CJEU con-
cerning questions referred for a preliminary ruling leads to the conclusion that 
there are no clear rules in this regulation which indicate that the jurisdiction of 
the authority making the reference for a preliminary ruling must be examined. It 
follows from the wording of Article 100 § 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court 
of Justice of 25 September 201211 that the Court, as a rule, has jurisdiction to hear 
and determine a question referred for a preliminary ruling unless the court raising 
the question withdraws its motion, which it may do until providing the date on 
which the judgement is pronounced. However, by virtue of § 2 of that Article, the 
Court may at any time find that the conditions of its competence are not satisfied, 
however, it is not a question of examining the competence of the national court. On 
the other hand, Article 267 TFEU provides that the CJEU has jurisdiction to give 
10 Due to Articles 29 and 49 of the Act of 25 July 2002 – Law on the system of administrative 
courts (Journal of Laws 2021, item 137).
11 OJ L 265/25, 29.09.2012.





preliminary rulings. It may be inferred from the second and third sentences of that 
provision that, where a question concerning the interpretation of the Treaties or the 
validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of 
the Union is raised before a national court, that court may or must refer that ques-
tion to the CJEU if the CJEU’s decision is necessary to resolve the case pending 
before the national court.12 The adoption of such legal solutions indicates that the 
jurisdiction to refer a question for a preliminary ruling is determined at the level of 
national law, which means that the national court must ensure that its jurisdiction 
to refer a question is observed.
Such a solution may, in principle, be regarded as correct, provided that the 
national courts act in accordance with the rules governing the proceedings before 
them and refer for a preliminary ruling questions relating to the matter under con-
sideration. If this is the case, the CJEU may assess the substance of the question 
from the perspective of the EU law. On that basis, it may either give or refuse to 
provide an answer. However, it appears that this is not an optimal situation, since 
the CJEU does not have a clearly defined way of verifying the jurisdiction of the 
authority submitting the question. As a consequence of the lack of such legal solu-
tions, a question for a preliminary ruling submitted by an unauthorised entity may 
be resolved. It comes out that this is the situation in the case of the CJEU judgement 
of 19 November 2019, when the CJEU answered the question presented by the 
Supreme Court in its decision of 30 August 2018.13
EU law does not define the concept of a preliminary ruling case. Article 267 TFEU 
only indicates what issues may be the subject of such a question and links them to 
the need to resolve the case pending before the court. Such an approach to a prelim-
inary ruling question unambiguously links the answer to the case pending before the 
court, and the national court’s inability to pronounce on issues of EU law. There is 
an extensive body of academic literature on the concept of the question referred for 
a preliminary ruling (in German: Vorfrage or Zwischenvrage).14 On the basis of the 
findings made therein, it should be assumed that the preliminary question resolved 
by a preliminary ruling is a question of law, which binds the court in the area of the 
preliminary question, when deciding the case pending before that court. The concept 
of the preliminary ruling case as used in academic and judicial research assumes that 
there is a close connection between the main proceedings and the legal issue which 
is the subject of the preliminary ruling. The relationship between the principal case 
12 More broadly, see M. Szpunar, Komentarz do art. 267 Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Eu-
ropejskiej, [in:] Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej, ed. A. Wróbel, vol. 3, Warszawa 2012.
13 III PO 7/18, BOSN.
14 For example, see J. Rodziewicz, Prejudycjalność w postępowaniu cywilnym, Gdańsk 2000, 
pp. 7–25; G. Łaszczyca, Zawieszenie ogólnego postępowania administracyjnego, Kraków 2005, 
pp. 87–121; Z. Czarnik, Podstawy zawieszenia postępowania sądowoadministracyjnego, Przemyśl 
2007, p. 233 ff.
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and the question for a preliminary ruling is characterised by the fact that the decision 
in the case for a preliminary ruling becomes the basis for the decision in the princi-
pal case. It is only disputed in academic circles whether the preliminary ruling is an 
element of the legal or factual basis of the principal decision.15
With such an understanding of the preliminary ruling case under Polish law, 
there is no reason why this concept should function in a different sense in connection 
with the question for a preliminary ruling to be determined by the CJEU, especially 
since under Article 267 TFEU it is a question of determining the validity and uni-
form interpretation to the EU law, and thus we are dealing here directly with a legal 
issue. If this is the nature of the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the 
CJEU, it follows that there must be a close connection between the principal case 
against which the question for a preliminary ruling is referred to the CJEU and the 
decision of the case by the court submitting the question, such that the principal 
case not only depends on the answer to the question, but also, and above all, falls 
within the cognition of the court submitting the question. The absence of such 
a relationship disqualifies the question and renders the answer legally uncertain.
In view of the above, serious doubts must be raised about the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, which initiated the preliminary ruling procedure with the question 
contained in the decision of 30 August 2018. It is difficult to look for justification 
for such an action in this ruling. In the extensive arguments, which are essentially 
collateral, because they refer to the statutory changes in the system of the Supreme 
Court and the scope of jurisdiction of the newly created chambers in that court, 
there are no convincing considerations that would justify the legal legitimacy of 
a preliminary ruling question to the CJEU. Thus, neither constitutional nor statu-
tory grounds for such action are indicated there. The Supreme Court limits itself to 
a laconic statement that the appeal against the resolution of the National Council 
of the Judiciary on retirement pursuant to Article 111 § 1 of the Supreme Court 
Act was directed to the Supreme Court – Labour and Social Insurance Chamber, 
and until the entry into force of the new Supreme Court Act, this Chamber was 
competent to hear such cases. It was inferred from this legal situation, which was 
not in force at the time the question was put to the CJEU, that the Labour and 
Social Insurance Chamber retained jurisdiction over these cases, since at the time 
the appeal against the resolution of the National Council of the Judiciary was filed, 
the Disciplinary Chamber established by the Supreme Court Act did not yet exist. 
Such considerations are surprising in their inconsistency, to say the least, and 
certainly cannot constitute a correct basis for establishing the jurisdiction of the 
15 See L. Peiper, Komentarz do kodeksu postępowania cywilnego, Kraków 1934, p. 450; 
J. Rodziewicz, op. cit., p. 32 ff. It is rather assumed that this is an element of the factual basis for 
judgements.





hitherto existing Labour and Social Insurance Chamber to submit a preliminary 
ruling question to the CJEU.
First of all, the jurisdiction of any authority, not to mention a court and not 
even the Supreme Court, cannot be the result of interpretation. It must follow 
directly from the provisions of the law. Therefore, assuming jurisdiction in the 
manner presented above, the Supreme Court should indicate the specific provisions 
determining its jurisdiction to submit a question. It did not do so, because it could 
not do so, as such norms did not exist at that moment. Nor do they exist in current 
law, despite the fact that the Supreme Court Act has been subject to numerous 
amendments since then. Nor can such a legal basis be reconstructed on the basis 
of the provisions of the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary. In the view 
of the above, one possible conclusion arises that the preliminary question which 
found its resolution in the CJEU judgement of 19 November 2019 was referred by 
the wrong court. As a consequence of this, a doubt arises as to the binding force of 
this judgement. Such a conclusion is justified in the current legal state.
In the Polish legal system, the acquisition of a retired status occurs as a result 
of either a judge’s transfer to retirement or a judge’s retirement. This different 
statutory presentation of the reasons for acquiring a retirement status forces us to 
consider the legal consequences of acquiring a retirement status on the basis of 
specific conditions. The nature and legal character of the status of judge is dis- 
puted. Neither the doctrine nor the judicature has reached an unequivocal conclusion 
in this respect.16 The lack of general agreement in this respect is not tantamount 
to the lack of certain findings as to the two-faceted nature of this relationship and 
acceptance of views that it consists of public law and employee elements.17 In view 
of the foregoing, a precise grasp of the meaning of the linguistic terms used by the 
legislature in describing the reason for the judicial retirement status appears to be 
necessary for a correct definition of retirement status. The constitutional regulation 
of the retired status cannot be overlooked either.
Article 180 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland18 provides that retire-
ment may result from various actions. It follows from the wording of Article 180 
(3) of the Polish Constitution19 that a judge may be retired as a result of illness or 
16 For example, see decision of the Supreme Court of 11 January 2016, III SO 3/16, LEX 
no. 2051075.
17 See Pozycja ustrojowa sędziego, eds. K. Gonera, R. Piotrowski, Warszawa 2015.
18 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997, no. 78, item 
483, as amended), hereinafter: the Polish Constitution. English translation of the Constitution at: 
www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm [access: 10.12.2021].
19 More broadly, see Z. Czarnik, Zagadnienia proceduralne sędziowskiego stanu spoczynku, 
Warszawa 2020, pp. 32–36; M.J. Zieliński, Obniżenie ustawowej granicy przechodzenia w stan 
spoczynku przez sędziów sądów powszechnych, administracyjnych i Sądu Najwyższego w świetle 
przepisów dyrektyw nr 2000/78/WE oraz 2006/54/WE, “Przegląd Sądowy” 2018, no. 10, pp. 5–25; 
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loss of strength preventing him or her from holding office. Therefore, one of the 
ways leading to retirement is the transfer into retirement when the loss of strength 
or illness has occurred. The second situation related to the retirement of a judge is 
set out in Article 180 (5) of the Polish Constitution. Here the constitutional legislator 
provides that in the event of a change in the system of courts or in the boundaries 
of court districts, a judge may be transferred to another court or retired with full 
emoluments. It should be noted that both editorial units of the analysed provision 
consistently use the term “transfer” to a retired status. Since transfer in such cases is 
always associated with an element of compulsion, the Polish Constitution requires 
that actions in this mode be subject to the right of appeal to court.
In turn, Article 180 (4) of the Polish Constitution provides for the attainment of 
retirement as a result of age. According to this provision, the law determines the age 
limit upon reaching which a judge retires. Thus, on account of age, a judge is not 
transferred to the retirement status, but a judge undergoes retirement. The linguistic 
distinction at the constitutional level between “transferring” and “undergoing” must 
lead to a distinction between the grounds and the ways of acquiring retirement. 
Thus, the correct definition of the mode of reaching retirement is important for the 
correct characterisation of the mechanisms governing the acquisition of retirement 
and, ultimately, the assignment of the appropriate legal means to guarantee the 
protection of the acquisition of the retirement status.
There is no doubt in the doctrine20 and judicature21 that constitutional terms 
have their own meaning, which cannot be determined on the basis of the content 
of terms found in ordinary legislation. This view has been consistently accepted, 
although it has been pointed out that the autonomy of constitutional notions may 
not lead to a complete disregard or rejection of the understanding of terms found 
in ordinary legislation.22 Emphasising the autonomous character of constitutional 
A.M. Światkowski, Prawny spór o zgodność z Konstytucją RP regulacji i ich następstw osiągnięcia 
„wieku emerytalnego” przez sędziów Sądu Najwyższego, “Palestra” 2018, n. 10, pp. 5–12.
20 See K. Zaradkiewicz, Instytucjonalizacja wolności majątkowej. Koncepcja prawa podsta-
wowego własności i jej urzeczywistnienie w prawie prywatnym, Warszawa 2013, p. 171 ff.; idem, 
Własność i jej ochrona jako wzorzec kontroli konstytucyjności. Wybrane problemy, “Kwartalnik Prawa 
Prywatnego” 2009, no. 3, p. 890; T. Dybowski, Konstytucyjne i cywilnoprawne pojęcie własności, 
[in:] Sądownictwo a obowiązujący system prawny. Materiały z konferencji zorganizowanej przez SN 
w dniach 13–14 lutego 1992 r., Warszawa 1992, pp. 190–191; L. Morawski, Wykładnia w orzecznictwie 
sądów, Toruń 2002, p. 209; S. Jarosz-Żukowska, Konstytucyjna zasada ochrony własności, Kraków 
2003, pp. 15–31; M. Gutowski, P. Kardas, Wykładnia i stosowanie prawa w procesie opartym na 
konstytucji, Warszawa 2017, pp. 528–530.
21 See judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 7 March 1995, W 9/94, OTK 1995, no. 1, 
item 20; judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 21 March 2000, K 14/99, OTK 2000, no. 2, item 
61; judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 March 2000, P 5/99, OTK 2000, no. 2, item 60.
22 Such an issue appears in the context of deliberations on the direct derogatory effect of a con-
stitutional norm. See M. Gutowski, P. Kardas, op. cit., pp. 583–616; judgement of the Constitutional 





notions one should always refer to the structure of the legal language shaped in 
the pre-constitutional practice of law application. Within the framework of the 
presented comments, the interpretation of the content of Article 180 (3) to (5) of 
the Polish Constitution does not seem to pose any difficulties, particularly since 
the constitutional and ordinary legislatures use the same terminology to define the 
same phenomena related to the acquisition of judicial retirement. For this reason, 
the autonomy of constitutional terms, important as it is as a theoretical issue, does 
not pose an interpretative problem with respect to retirement status, although the 
jurisprudence pays little attention23 to it and even fails to note the linguistic dis-
tinctions made under the Constitution. The finding of such a fact should be a cause 
for concern, since the application of the law must first and foremost be connected 
with determining the content of the norms applied, and this can only be done on 
the basis of language.24
It should be stressed once again that the constitutional regulation of retirement 
status coincides with the statutory one when it comes to the terminology describ-
ing the transformation of an active judgeship into a retirement status. Paragraphs 
3 and 5 of Article 180 of the Polish Constitution indicate the transfer of a judge 
to a retired status, while paragraph 3 of this provision regulates the transition to 
a retired status. The statutory solutions correspond to this approach. Each of the 
laws regulating retirement of judges distinguishes between transfer and retirement. 
The acts in this respect consistently differentiate between the criteria for retirement 
and also regulate the procedure leading to its determination in a different manner. 
From this perspective, the regulation of the Supreme Court Act must be stated to 
be precise and consistent, which must be viewed positively, since such a state con-
stitutes a guarantee of judicial independence. What may cause concern, however, 
is the practice of treating such linguistic obviousness in a rather relaxed manner, 
assuming that each basis for retirement of judges is subject to the same legal pro-
cedure. Hence, there is the problem of the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling 
question to the CJEU posed by the Supreme Court of 30 August 2018.
It should be noted that even the Act 12 May 2011 on the National Council 
of the Judiciary25 does not contain a regulation which could provide a basis for 
ascribing jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in matters of retirement. It follows 
from Article 3 (2) of the National Council of the Judiciary Act, i.e. the provision 
defining the tasks of the Council, that with respect to matters concerning judges 
Tribunal of 6 October 1998, K 36/97, OTK 1998, no. 5, item 65; judgement of the Constitutional 
Tribunal of 8 March 2000, Pp 1/99, OTK 2000, no. 2, item 98; resolution of the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court of 12 October 1998, OPS 5/98, ONSA 1999, no. 1, item 1.
23 See decision of the Supreme Court of 30 August 2018, III PO 7/18, BOSN.
24 See Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza. Nowa retoryka, Warszawa 1980, pp. 164–165.
25 Journal of Laws 2019, item 84, hereinafter: National Council of the Judiciary Act.
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the Council has two powers, obviously apart from its competence in nomination 
proceedings. These include motions to transfer a judge to a retired status and mo-
tions by retired judges to return to judicial office. These two powers encapsulate 
the Council’s authority in relation to judges. The Council’s authority to act in other 
matters, namely retirement, cannot be derived from those provisions. Irrespective 
of that, any acts undertaken by that body may be appealed against on the principles 
arising from the provisions of law. Thus, they may be the subject of an appeal to 
the Supreme Court in strictly indicated situations. In the remaining scope, such 
a way does not exist, which does not mean that they are beyond control. It seems 
that they are subject to such control, however, in court-administrative proceedings, 
and thus may be subject to a complaint to that court.26
First and foremost, the jurisdiction of the National Council of the Judiciary to 
act in the matter of retired judges cannot be derived from the provisions of Chapter 3 
of the National Council of the Judiciary Act, which regulates proceedings before 
the Council. The fact that it follows from Article 29 (1) of the National Council of 
the Judiciary Act that in individual cases the person whose rights or obligations are 
to be affected by the resolution of the Council is a party to the proceedings cannot 
be inferred that the Council may act in every individual case.27 First of all, this 
provision is a procedural provision, and thus it does not constitute subjective rights, 
and moreover, it can only be interpreted in such a way that if the matter falls within 
the Council’s jurisdiction and is an individual case, then the person whose case is 
being handled by the Council is a party to the proceedings.28 For these reasons the 
view that the Council is the body authorised to pronounce on retirement is all the 
more unfounded, since it has such authorisation only when a judge is transferred to 
this status. The practice shaped against this background, which is inherently flawed, 
cannot be the basis for submitting a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, as argued by 
the Supreme Court in its decision of 30 August 2018, and as a result for the CJEU29 
to issue a judgement and the Supreme Court to adopt a resolution.30
The consequence of the presented position cannot be the assertion that the 
retirement of a judge is excluded from control. On the contrary, the view that 
such control of retirement does not lie with the Supreme Court seems justified. An 
analysis of the existing legal state justifies the view that this type of case is subject 
26 See Z. Czarnik, Zagadnienia proceduralne…, pp. 96–112; S. Biernat, Czy i jak kontrolować 
procedurę powołania sędziów do Sądu Najwyższego, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2021, no. 3, 
p. 1 ff.
27 See inaccurately M. Niezgódka-Medek, R. Pęk, Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa. Komentarz, 
LEX/el. 2013, commentary to Article 29.
28 See Z. Czarnik, Zagadnienia proceduralne…, p. 110.
29 Judgement of the CJEU of 19 November 2019, C-585/19, C-624/18 and C-625/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:982.
30 Resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 January 2020, BSA I 4110-1/20, LEX no. 2770251.





to review by the administrative courts. The following circumstances support such 
a thesis. Since its enactment, Article 44 of the National Council of the Judiciary 
Act has provided that a participant in proceedings may appeal to the Supreme 
Court on the grounds that a resolution is contrary to the law, unless the provisions 
provide otherwise. It is apparent from the wording of the chapter in which this 
provision is found that the resolutions subject to appeal relate to applications for 
judicial office (Article 35), retirement of a judge (Article 38) and return to active 
status (Article 39).31
Thus, it is only in this catalogue of matters that the Council’s authority to 
act, i.e. adopt a resolution, is confined and only such resolution may be appealed 
against by a participant to the Supreme Court. The provisions under analysis were 
subject to numerous amendments in connection with the dispute over the judiciary 
 reform, but the appeal mechanism adopted therein was not subject to change, 
although at one point the legislator introduced a solution whereby in individual 
cases concerning the appointment to the office of a judge of the Supreme Court, 
an appeal was to be lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court, and not with 
the Supreme Court as in the case of other judges.32 The reasons for this change 
were not clearly articulated, but from a systemic perspective it was a solution that 
seemed more appropriate than leaving the path before the Supreme Court. It was 
more appropriate because, in the case of an appointment, the essence of the matter 
concerns a public-law issue, so it naturally falls more within the broader meaning 
of public administration in the constitutional sense, especially as there is no dispute 
in the case law that the National Council of the Judiciary should be treated as an 
authority within the meaning of Article 184 of the Polish Constitution.33
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ANALYSIS – JURISDICTION TO RULE ON 
THE RETIREMENT STATUS OF A JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
Summing up, it should be stated that under the current law the choice of the 
appropriate way to protect a judge in connection with his/her retirement is an am-
biguous issue. It appears, however, that the state of the law permits acceptance, 
as justified, of the position that with respect to the retired status of a judge, the 
31 I have already presented this issue extensively earlier and in this respect I rely on the view. 
See Z. Czarnik, Legal nature of an official act of the President of the Republic of Poland pronouncing 
retirement of the Supreme Court judge, “Ius Novum” 2020, no. 2, pp. 120–134.
32 Article 44 (1a) of the National Council of the Judiciary Act until 1 April 2019 in conjunction 
with the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 March 2019, K 12/18, Journal of Laws 2019, 
item 609.
33 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 29 November 2007, SK 43/06, OTK 2007, no. 10, 
item 130.
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appropriate and legally justified route is the civil procedure, which functions as 
a uniform solution for all judges, irrespective of the fact that certain solutions with 
respect to judges of the Supreme Court and judges of common courts may differ in 
detail. The provisions of the Supreme Court Act, but also of the National Council 
of the Judiciary Act, speak directly in favour of the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court in these matters. “Undergoing retirement” is not a “transfer” and thus the 
procedure specific to transfer cannot be applied to it. The law does not contain 
specific solutions in this respect, leaving this issue to interpretation, and this allows 
us to claim that the path of judicial-administrative control is open for the transition.
This type of review meets the constitutional requirement of guaranteeing the 
right to a court, and since the transfer is the result of the occurrence of conditions 
specified by law, the scope of such review is limited to examining the legality of 
the act confirming the retirement. This means that the administrative court’s ex-
amination of only the legality of the act meets the constitutional standard for the 
protection of the judge. The result of such a position must be the conclusion that 
the Supreme Court had no competence to formulate the question to the CJEU in 
its decision of 30 August 2018, and the judgement itself, which is the answer to it, 
is issued in a case which was not materially the main case decided by the Supreme 
Court. For these reasons, it should be considered that both the Supreme Court in 
this case and the CJEU ruled beyond the competences granted by law.
In a different formal aspect, the judgement of the CJEU of 2 March 2021 
should be assessed. The necessity to ask questions in this respect was derived 
from the episodic regulation of the appeal route against the resolution of the Na-
tional Council of the Judiciary presenting candidates for the position of judge in 
the Supreme Court and the assumption in this regulation that the route before the 
Supreme Administrative Court is appropriate for these candidates for judges. The 
introduction of such a solution into the Act was motivated by extra-legal reasons, 
but the procedural effect seemed correct. Firstly, to a certain extent it introduced an 
element of independence into the assessment of such resolutions, because the appeal 
was examined by a body other than that to which the candidates had applied, thus 
confirming the nemo iudex in causa sua rule. At the same time, this solution was 
not entirely consistent, as the provisions on the Supreme Court applied to Supreme 
Administrative Court judges accordingly. Secondly, it indicated a more appropriate 
way to control such acts due to the public-law nature of the appointment.
Such a view seems appropriate in spite of what the constitutionality of the 
appeal route adopted in Article 44 (1a) of the National Council of the Judiciary 
Act was found by the Constitutional Tribunal.34 In this respect, the Constitutional 
Tribunal stated that there are no legal premises supporting the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Administrative Court as a court authorised to examine the appeal in the 
34 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 March 2019, K 12/18, OTK 2019, item 17.





matter of appointment to a judicial post in the Supreme Court. At the same time, 
the Constitutional Tribunal confirmed that in such proceedings, the court reviewing 
the National Council of the Judiciary resolution in this matter may not make a sub-
stantive assessment of the conditions fulfilled by a candidate for a judge, but should 
only comment on the legality of the procedure itself, in which such assessment is 
made. With this position, it referred to an earlier judgement of the Constitutional 
Tribunal establishing the scope of the appealability of a resolution of the National 
Council of the Judiciary indicating a candidate for a judicial post. Thus, in its 
judgement of 25 March 2019, the Constitutional Tribunal, ruling in favour of an 
appeal route before the Supreme Court, contradicted the assumption made earlier 
in the justification of the judgement,35 which, in the opinion of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, should support the examination of the case by the Supreme Court.
Since the subject of such an appeal is only the legality of the procedure in 
which the opinion on the candidate was formulated, it does not in any way concern 
the substantive examination of the case, and this context would determine – in the 
opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal – the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It 
seems that the opposite is true. The legality of the authorities’ actions is the sphere 
of judicial and administrative control. Undoubtedly, the Constitutional Tribunal 
is correct when it asserts that there are no systemic reasons for the same cases to 
be within the jurisdiction of two different courts. It should be assumed that from 
a logical point of view, the opposite conclusion is correct. This does not change 
the normative state of affairs, because the legislature has determined that appeals 
against resolutions of the National Council of the Judiciary assessing candidates 
for judges are within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Such a solution is not 
juridically sound, but it is permissible under the constitutional provisions.
After all, Article 183 (2) of the Polish Constitution provides that the Supreme 
Court performs the activities set forth in the Constitution and statutes, while Ar-
ticle 184 of the Polish Constitution implies that administrative courts and the 
Supreme Administrative Court exercise control over public administration within 
the scope specified by law. Thus, the law may make different choices as to the 
way of appealing against resolutions of the National Council of the Judiciary. It 
should be stressed, however, that the freedom of legislative choice in this matter 
is not complete, and the legislator should take into account the nature of the cases, 
while dividing them between common and administrative courts. In the analysed 
case this rule was not realised, which is probably not a correct systemic approach. 
However, it is a solution that meets the standard of constitutionality in the sense 
that it provides the person participating in the competition with the right to a court. 
Although it is limited only to the formal context, even in this scope it meets the 
constitutional requirement of Article 45 of the Polish Constitution. The same scope 
35 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 27 May 2008, SK 57/06, OTK 2008, item 63.
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of this right is exercised by the Supreme Administrative Court, so it is difficult to 
find any superfluity in the position of the Constitutional Tribunal that would speak 
in favour of adjudication by the Supreme Administrative Court.
Therefore, the preliminary ruling by the Supreme Administrative Court to the 
CJEU in these cases had a clear statutory basis, regardless of the assessment of the 
constitutionality of the adopted solution. This means that at the moment of putting 
forward the questions, there were no doubts as to the legal basis for such action. 
The Supreme Administrative Court did not presume its jurisdiction in this respect. 
It was implementing the provisions of the Act. Another issue is the content of the 
answer given, especially the potential necessity to apply EU law in a situation 
where it would be in contradiction with the Polish Constitution. In this respect, 
one may have serious doubts whether such an action is permissible on the grounds 
of the extensive jurisprudence36 of the Constitutional Tribunal and the views of 
the judicature. However, from the formal point of view, the response of the CJEU 
is directly and closely connected with the main case pending before the Supreme 
Administrative Court. Therefore, it should be recognised that in this case we are 
dealing with a correctly posed preliminary ruling question, and the consequences 
of the answer to it must be taken into account in the examined cases according to 
the criteria set out by the Constitutional Tribunal.
Of course, it is possible to take into account the position of the CJEU only 
to the extent permitted by the constitutional framework, bearing in mind that, in 
many areas, there is an identity of standards between the Polish Constitution and 
EU law, so that in these areas there is never a collision of legal norms.37 Never-
theless, it should be consistently held that EU law is directly applicable only to 
the extent permitted by the Polish constitutional order. EU law, and especially the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU, which is a specific source of law, may not invalidate 
constitutional regulations. This follows directly from the views presented by the 
Constitutional Tribunal,38 which does not apply the principle of precedence directly 
to the Constitution. Such a phenomenon is not only a Polish characteristic. In theses 
16–19 of the French Constitutional Council of 20 December 2007, it was clearly 
articulated that the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is possible only with a constitu-
tional amendment, as only in this legal solution can no treaty conditions infringing 
36 See J. Barcz, Glosa do wyroku TK z 11.05.2004, K 18/04 (zgodność Traktatu akcesyjnego 
z Konstytucją RP, K 18/04), “Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego” 2005, no. 4, p. 169.
37 More broadly, see N. Półtorak, Imagine – rola prawa i prawników w integracji europejskiej, 
“Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2021, no. 3, pp. 4–7; K. Lenaerts, Żadne państwo członkowskie nie 
jest równiejsze od innych – zasada pierwszeństwa prawa Unii Europejskiej i zasada równości państw 
wobec traktatów, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2021, no. 1, pp. 4–7.
38 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 11 May 2005, K 18/04, OTK 2005, no. 5, item 49. 
Especially, see judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 24 November 2010, K 32/09, OTK 2010, 
no. 9, item 108.





the exercise of national sovereignty be imposed. The Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany39 has expressed itself in a similar direction.
Thus, under Polish law, the principle of the primacy (supremacy) of EU law over 
domestic law should be adopted, but in a form that does not violate the constitutional 
order, i.e. in so far as the answer to the question for a preliminary ruling does not 
invalidate the constitutional provision. The need to observe such a rule should be 
the starting point for the rulings of the CJEU when answering the questions posed. 
Such a presumption allows the law to be harmonised at national level, either through 
interpretation or sometimes through constitutional amendments. On the other hand, 
it protects internal legal orders from unauthorised shaping of their foundations by 
the CJEU, which, as an EU court, should not have any direct influence on constitu-
tional legislation, especially because the EU constitution, which provided for such 
a solution, has not been adopted. The rejection of such a mechanism cannot result 
in the admissibility of its introduction by way of accomplished facts.
In view of the above, it should be assumed that the judgement of the CJEU of 
2 March 2021 on the formal level meets all the conditions set out by the provisions 
of EU law. It provides an answer to the question posed by the competent court at 
the moment of posing the question and is connected to the case pending before 
this court. In this way, it differs from the judgement of the CJEU of 19 November 
2019, as that one resolved a case presented as a question by a court with no juris-
diction. However, in terms of its merits, it is acceptable only if a binding assump-
tion is made that the demonstrated contradiction of Article 44 (1) and (1a) of the 
National Council of the Judiciary Act with constitutional provisions, as the basis 
for assessing the appeal procedure to the Supreme Administrative Court, will be 
understood only as the necessity to refer this legal solution to the principles set out 
in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and not as a requirement to disregard 
them as contrary to EU law.
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ABSTRAKT
Przedstawiona analiza odnosi się do wpływu orzecznictwa Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii 
Europejskiej (TSUE) na kształtowanie w Polsce sytuacji prawnej sędziów Sądu Najwyższego (SN) 
i Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego (NSA). Głównym założeniem przedstawionych rozważań jest 
stwierdzenie, że TSUE w ramach udzielanych odpowiedzi na pytania prejudycjalne, kierowane do 
niego przez polskie sądy, rozpoznające sprawy związane z powołaniami na stanowisko sędziowskie 
oraz z przejściem w stan spoczynku, wzmacnia niezależność sądów i niezawisłość sędziowską, 
przyjmując, że są to elementy ustrojowe funkcjonującego wymiaru sprawiedliwości podlegające 
prawu Unii Europejskiej. Z tego powodu TSUE uznaje się za właściwy do kształtowania tych war-
tości ustrojowych na gruncie prawa polskiego. Jednocześnie organ ten nie zauważa problemu wła-
ściwości polskich sądów występujących z pytaniami prawnymi, co staje się ważnym zagadnieniem 
teoretycznym i praktycznym, gdyż może rzutować na legalność i skuteczność orzeczeń zapadających 
na podstawie udzielonych przez TSUE odpowiedzi. Szczegółowe rozważania koncentrują się na 
dwóch rodzajach orzeczeń TSUE, które zapadły w związku z sędziowskim stanem spoczynku, na 
skutek wystąpienia do TSUE z pytaniami przez SN i NSA. Przedmiot pytań odnosił się do zgodno-
ści z prawem unijnym zakresu ochrony prawnej przyznanej w prawie polskim sędziemu od uchwał 
podejmowanych w tych sprawach przez Krajową Radę Sądownictwa. Konkluzją przedstawionych 
rozważań jest stwierdzenie, że w przypadku wyroku TSUE wydanego na skutek pytania SN doszło 
do naruszenia właściwości organu występującego z pytaniem, a to powinno mieć konsekwencje dla 
zakresu związania sądu orzekającego odpowiedzią udzieloną przez TSUE.
Słowa kluczowe: pytanie prejudycjalne; Trybunał Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej; Krajowa 
Rada Sądownictwa; stan spoczynku sędziego; prawo polskie
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